THE FAILURE OF RISK REFORM
LEGISLATION IN THE 104TH CONGRESS
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Rational choice theory, true to its roots in neo-classical economics, assumes preferences to be fixed and typically avoids conjec1
ture about how those preferences are formed. This investigation of
the failure of risk reform legislation during the 104th Congress illustrates both the value and the limits of a rational choice approach.
Absent an investigation of the more fundamental moral conflict underlying the dialogue over risk reform, a rational choice approach is
of limited value. This investigation demonstrates that the failure of
risk reform is more completely explained by examining the conflicting moral discourses that underpinned the different positions
adopted by politicians during the risk reform debate.
While the rational choice approach to politics can be traced back
to the early twentieth century, the modern movement established it2
3
self with classic works by Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Downs, and
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1. See Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. PHIL. 71,
71-73, 87 (1994) (“[T]he content of those preferences is irrelevant to the theory. It does not
matter, for example, what reasons the agent has for her preferences, or indeed why she has
come to hold them at all.”).
Saltz and Ferejohn argue that “rational-choice explanations are most plausible in settings
in which individual action is severely constrained;” thus, rational choice theory “gets its explanatory power from structure-generated interests and not from individual psychology.” Id. at
72. Therefore, rational choice theory is most successful at explaining outcomes where “agents
are operating in a competitive environment characterized by extreme scarcity, in which it is
plausible to impute interests to the various acting parties.” Id. at 87. An example is “the classical theory of electoral competition which rests on the assumption that candidates are motivated
to seek office rather than pursue policy goals.” Id. However, Saltz and Ferejohn argue that “in
the absence of strong environmental constraints . . . rational choice is a weak theory, with limited predictive power.” Id. at 72.
2. See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
3. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
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4

Mancur Olson. Arrow, Downs, Olson and others generally agree on
5
three key principles. First, the utility maximizing individual represents the sole focus and fountain of all rational choices, whether
6
made in politics or the supermarket. Second, the choices of these rational individuals are based on a fixed, hierarchical set of preferences.
Third, given sufficient empirical, scientific observation, rational
choice theorists assume that universal laws and predictions can be
developed based on the rational activity (or inactivity) of political individuals. By applying these principles, much can be learned about
the failure of risk reform legislation by assuming that the leading protagonists, President William J. Clinton and Senator Robert J. Dole,
had simple and fixed preferences. Each wanted to win the 1996 presidential election. Thus, the rational choice explanation of the failure
of risk reform hinges upon how Dole and Clinton perceived their
chances to be affected by the risk reform debate.
While such an approach to the study of politics is not without
merit, it frequently fails to provide sufficient causal understanding in
empirical applications. As John Ferejohn suggests, “[U]nless we substantially enrich the concept of rationality itself, or supplement it
with extra assumptions about human nature, rationality by itself cannot fully account for the selection of one outcome rather than an7
other.” Rational choice analysis alone begs a more fundamental
question: if Clinton and Dole were influenced by public opinion, why
and how was that opinion formed? We argue, that, to a considerable
extent, public opinion about this issue was formed in response to arguments framed on the basis of competing and mutually exclusive
realms of moral discourse. By examining the underlying moral conflict that informed the creation, debate, modification and eventual
defeat of the 1995 risk reform legislation, we hope to demonstrate

4. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
5. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 14-17 (1994).
6. As Gordon Tullock, an early leader in a more scientific understanding of political behavior, suggests, “[v]oters and customers are essentially the same people. Mr. Smith buys and
votes; he is the same man in the supermarket and in the voting booth.” GORDON TULLOCK,
THE VOTE MOTIVE: AN ESSAY IN THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICS, WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE
BRITISH ECONOMY 5 (1976).
7. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 26 (quoting John Ferejohn from his article
Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF
RATIONAL ACTION 284 (Kristen R. Monroe ed., 1991)).
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that a purely rational choice approach offers too limited a perspective
on an otherwise profound clash of ethical and political values.
Part I of this essay reviews risk reform legislation as proposed in
the 104th Congress, focusing attention on the most contentious issues
in the risk reform debate. It then analyzes the legislation using the
tools of conventional political science.
Part II examines the interaction between congressional consideration of risk analysis in the 104th Congress and the 1996 presidential campaign. It explains the reasons for Robert Dole’s choice to act
as primary proponent of risk reform and the reasons for President
Clinton’s choice to act as risk reform’s chief detractor. Part II begins
by comparing and contrasting the risk reform debate with legislative
battle over passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act and ends by revisiting
the conventional political science approach in light of risk reform’s
failure.
Part III examines the problem of preference formation and its
relation to public and moral debate regarding environmental risk. It
explores the fundamental differences between a utilitarian and a
rights-based view of the environment. This part analyzes the risk reform debate in the context of the clash between these differing regimes of moral discourse, informing both the rational choice and
conventional political science explanations of risk reform’s failure.
PART I: THE RISK REFORM DEBATE
A. Risk Reform: The Legislation
Risk reform was among the legislative priorities enumerated in
the Contract with America to which House Republicans pledged
8
themselves in the 1996 elections. The “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995,” which contained the new risk assessment reform measures, passed the House of Representatives early in the first
9
session of the 104th Congress by a vote of 277 - 141. However, the

8. See NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 11, 125, 131-32 (Ed Gillespie
& Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (promising to vote on the “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement
Act” in the first one hundred days of a Republican House majority and explaining that the Act,
in addition to requiring “each federal agency to assess the risks to human health and the environment for each new regulation,” requires agencies to “also provide the cost associated with
[new] regulation and an analysis comparing the economic and compliance costs of the regulation to the public”).
9. See H.R. 9, 104th Cong. §§411-24 (1995).
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real struggle over its passage took place in the Senate, whose Repub10
lican majority had not made a similar pledge.
Risk reform legislation essentially sought to require federal
agencies to conduct risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses of
proposed new regulations and to justify their actions on the basis of
11
those analyses. Two of the most hotly contested issues were: the
threshold above which risk analysis would be required; and the extent
to which individuals could petition the government requesting either
an assessment of pending regulation or peer review of a previously
performed risk assessment. Such assessments and reviews could then
serve as the basis for judicial review.
In the Senate deliberations, the threshold figure vacillated be12
tween fifty million and one hundred million dollars. The higher
threshold was estimated to sharply reduce the number of proposed
13
regulations subject to the risk assessment requirement. The Senate
Republicans, under Dole’s leadership, were ultimately willing to
compromise on the matter of the threshold. Late in the game, they
14
agreed to adopt the one hundred million dollar figure. But their refusal to compromise on judicial review ultimately led to the bill's de15
feat.
10. For the Senate version of risk reform sponsored by Senator Dole see S. 343, 104th
Cong. (1995). While there were other competing regulatory reform bills in the Senate simultaneously, for example S. 291, 104th Cong. (1995), this article will focus on S. 343, the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995.
11. See Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995);
H.R. 9, 104th Cong. §§ 421-422 (1995); Bob Benenson, Opponents Whittle Away at Dole’s
Overhaul Bill, 53 CONG. Q. 2049, 2049 (1995) [hereinafter Benenson, Opponents] (“[T]he bill
(S. 343) would require federal agencies to conduct elaborate risk assessments and cost-benefit
analyses to justify many new regulations.”); Bob Benenson, GOP Sets the 104th Congress on
New Regulatory Course, 53 CONG. Q. 1693, 1695 (1995) (“H.R. 9 and S. 343 . . . would require
agencies to conduct detailed analyses of the environmental risks . . . proposed regulations seek
to address and then to quantify that the benefits of the regulations would exceed the economic
costs to individuals and society.”).
12. See Benenson, Opponents, supra note 11, at 2049 (“[T]he Senate voted 53-45 on July
11 to require agencies to conduct detailed analyses only on those regulations with an expected
annual economic impact of $100 million. The original draft set the threshold for analysis at $50
million.”).
13. See id.
14. See Bob Benenson, Senators Roll Back Restrictions Proposed by Regulatory Overhaul,
53 CONG. Q. 2160, 2160 (1995) (J. Bennett Johnston’s amendment, “adopted 53-45,” required
“that federal agencies undertake risk assessments, cost-benefit analyses and other procedures
only for those new and existing regulations with an annual economic cost of $100 million,
rather than the $50 million threshold in the bill.”).
15. See Bob Benenson, Procedural Overhaul Fails After Three Tough Votes, 53 CONG. Q.
2159, 2159, 2161 (1995) [hereinafter Benenson, Overhaul] (“During the weeks of debate, Dole
made concessions to opponents. But he continued to insist that the Senate . . . expand opportu-

Fall 1998]

THE FAILURE OF RISK REFORM

117

B. Risk Reform: Conventional Political Science Wisdom
The demise of risk reform is particularly interesting because it
goes against the grain of conventional political science interpretation.
At first glance, the legislation appeared fail-proof. It met five of the
most important criteria that political scientists posit when they try to
explain why a bill becomes a law: it received widespread support
within the expert community, it was procedural in nature rather than
substantive, the business community was united in support of the
legislation, it had received favorable attention within Congress, and
16
the congressional majority party was pledged to pass it.
First, risk reform enjoyed widespread support within the most
relevant expert community. In 1987 an EPA task force issued a report, Unfinished Business, in which the agency seemingly espoused a
view long held by environmental economists and risk scientists: the
attention paid to a particular problem by the agency should correspond to the level of risk posed by that problem. The report described a shocking mismatch between what experts took to be the
most serious environmental problems and what problems the agency
17
spent its resources addressing. Three years later, the Agency’s Science Advisory Board produced a more extensive document that
18
came to similar conclusions.
Second, the 1995 legislation addressed esoteric, technical aspects
of procedure, not volatile substantive issues, and was therefore less
likely to arouse opposition. It proposed no reductions in pollution
control efforts. Rather, it mandated more extensive use of a tech-

nities for regulated parties to sue federal agencies over their adherence to administrative procedures[ ] and allow individuals to petition agencies to modify or revoke regulations.”).
16. Several discussions of agenda setting in policy-making as well as why policies succeed
or fail are available. See, e.g., JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVE AND PUBLIC
POLICIES (1995); JOHN B. BADER, TAKING THE INITIATIVE: LEADERSHIP AGENDAS IN THE
CONGRESS AND THE 'CONTRACT WITH AMERICA' (1996); FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER &
BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); MARTHA
DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); THE NEW POLITICS
OF PUBLIC POLICY (Marc Landy & Martin Levin eds., 1995).
17. See 1 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS at xv (1987) (“The rankings by
risk [ ] do not correspond well with EPA’s current program priorities . . . . Overall, EPA’s priorities appear more closely aligned with public opinion than with [ ] estimated risks.”).
18. See SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
3 (1990) (“[Q]uestions of relative seriousness or urgency generally have remained unasked.
Consequently, at EPA there has been little correlation between the relative resources dedicated to different environmental problems and the relative risks posed by those problems.”).
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nique, risk-benefit analysis, in order to put environmental regulation
on a sounder analytical footing.
Third, the business community was united in support of the legislation. Often the business community has difficulty becoming and
remaining united in support of a particular piece of legislation, and
ensuing rifts in the community are easily exploited by a bill’s opponents. No such difficulties were encountered during the risk reform
debate. Numerous organizations, such as the National Association of
19
Manufacturers and trade associations representing the plastics, elec20
tric utilities, and food manufacturing industries, supported the bill.
Indeed, support extended beyond the profit-making sector to include
21
organizations like the National School Boards Association.
Fourth, the idea of risk reform had already received extensive
favorable attention and deliberation within the Congress. The Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, historically the most
active and successful generator of environmental legislation, had
conducted hearings on the problem, and its leadership had introduced risk reform legislation. In fact, in 1993 when Democrats enjoyed control of both Houses, the Senate passed a version of risk re22
form almost unanimously!
Fifth, the congressional majority party was pledged to pass risk
23
reform legislation. Although many Democrats were also pledged to
support risk reform, the issue had historically been more popular
among Republicans. When the Republicans gained control of the
104th Congress, their leaders went on record in support of it. As a
24
key element in the Contract with America, risk reform legislation received unparalleled leadership support and public prominence.

19. See Margaret Kriz, Risky Business, 27 NAT’L J. 417, 418 (1995) [hereinafter Kriz, Risky
Business] (“At a . . . hearing of the House Commerce Committee . . . the president of the National Association of Manufacturers…asserted that government regulation has a domino effect.
He argued that every dollar spent on pollution abatement translates into $3-$4 of lost productivity.”).
20. See John H. Cushman Jr., Backed by Business, G.O.P. Takes Steps to Overhaul Environmental Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at A22.
21. See Kriz, Risky Business, supra note 19, at 418 (“A representative of the National
School Boards Association, for example, told the House Commerce Committee that the nation’s school systems have been forced to spend $10 billion to remove asbestos…because of a
rule adopted in 1982 by the [EPA] . . . . The regulation was based on scientific studies that
some regulators now say were riddled with errors.”).
22. See S. 171, 103th Cong. § 123 (1993).
23. See GINGRICH ET AL., supra note 8, at 131-32, 135.
24. See id.
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Given risk reform’s support among experts, its procedural nature, endorsement by the business community, a history with former
Congresses, and a prominent place on the legislative dance card, how
could it fail to pass? The answer is two-fold. The proximate cause was
the intrusion of presidential election politics. Rational choice theory
remains sufficient to understand such political dynamics. However, a
more fundamental cause concerns the nature of the discourse surrounding the idea of risk analysis and its application to environ25
mental problems.
PART II: CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION AND PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS
A. Presidential Politics and the 1970 Clean Air Act
Presidential electoral politics defeated a seemingly invincible
risk reform bill in 1995; however, political contests have not always
had a negative effect on legislation. Indeed, the most ambitious of all
26
environmental laws, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, owe
27
their passage to presidential politics. Senator Edmund Muskie of
Maine had established himself as Congress’ leading environmental
28
expert. He had overseen the drafting of the 1967 Air Quality Act
29
(AQA), a modest affair in which the federal government delegated
30
much of its regulatory power to the states. That approach proved
31
ineffective, and Muskie proposed to improve its performance by
making incremental changes, thereby balancing air quality with economic concerns about the regulation’s effect on state employment

25. See discussion infra Part III.
26. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified and amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401671(q) (1994)).
27. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FROM
NIXON TO CLINTON: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 26-30 (expanded 2d ed. 1994).
28. See id. at 27-28.
29. Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (codified and amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401671(q) (1994)).
30. The 1967 Air Quality Act, which was to be reauthorized in 1970, required the states to
establish and enforce air quality standards while the federal government’s role was limited to
review and approval. Senator Muskie had resisted efforts to create national uniform emission
limits in his belief that states should bear the primary responsibility for formulation and implementation of pollution control. See LANDY ET AL., supra note 27, at 28.
31. See id. at 28-29 (“Progress had been disappointing. As of 1970, not a single state implementation plan had been approved by the federal government. More seriously, the act’s reliance on the states led some to doubt as to whether it could succeed. Critics feared that states
would compete for new industry by keeping standards permissive and enforcement lax.”).
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32

levels. Ralph Nader responded to Muskie’s modest initiative by denouncing Muskie as a tool of industry and proposing a much more
ambitious plan in which national clean air standards would be set by
33
the federal government. President Richard Nixon, not previously
known as an ally of environmentalists, responded with his own initia34
tive that resembled Nader’s version.
Nixon’s “conversion” is explicable only with resort to the politics
35
of the 1972 presidential election. Nixon’s willingness to address the
popular issue of pollution control was strongly influenced by a desire
36
to out-rival Muskie. Muskie was the front runner for the Democratic nomination, and based on his impressive showing as the 1968
Democratic vice-presidential candidate, he posed a serious threat to
37
Nixon’s re-election.
Nixon recognized that Nader’s attack on
Muskie presented him with an opportunity to both tarnish Muskie’s
image and to improve his own standing with the growing middle class
environmental constituency. Muskie responded by tearing up his
modest bill and proposing a version that was even stronger than
38
Nixon’s. This competition for the environmental mantle between
the two most prominent leaders of their respective parties secured
passage of a clean air act far more stringent than seemed conceivable
just a few months earlier.
The key differences between the Clean Air Act Amendments of
39
40
1970 and the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995 stem
from the different roles played by intra-party politics, Congressional
rules, and the dynamics of public opinion. In the first instance, intraparty politics did not play a significant role. Nixon was assured reelection and felt free to adopt whatever position on the Clean Air
41
Act would most enhance his general election prospects. Although
Muskie would ultimately lose his nomination bid, his intra-party
problems did not stem from his adoption of a more ambitious clean
air act position. Indeed, had he stuck to his earlier moderate position
32. See id. at 29.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Marc K. Landy, The New Politics of Environmental Policy, in THE NEW POLITICS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209, 209-10 (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995).
36. See id.
37. See LANDY ET AL., supra note 27, at 28.
38. See id. at 30.
39. See supra note 26.
40. See Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
41. See Landy, supra note 35, at 209, 211.
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he would have probably faced intense criticism from McGovern.
Both Muskie and Nixon perceived that public opinion was strongly
42
and consistently in favor of stringent environmental regulation.
The risk reform case does bear one striking similarity to the
Clean Air Act case. In both instances a senator of great stature was
simultaneously the front runner for the nomination to oppose an incumbent president and the leader of the congressional forces seeking
to pass the legislation in question. But here the analogy ends. Unlike
Muskie, Senate Majority Leader Dole was most concerned with the
legislation’s impact on his nomination, not his election. Unlike
Nixon, Bill Clinton came to see opposition to the legislation as more
in his electoral interest than support of it.
B. Bob Dole and Intra-Party Dynamics
Robert Dole had emerged as his party’s clear front runner for
43
the 1996 nomination, but his nomination was far from certain. Both
his age and his image as a “Washington insider” mitigated against
44
him. But even more damaging was that in field of presidential candidates which leaned inexorably to the right, he was viewed as exces45
sively moderate. His very skill as a legislative tactician was being
turned against him on the grounds that he would rather enjoy the
satisfaction of crafting a successful compromise than remain true to
46
conservative principles.
42. See id. at 209-11.
43. See Larry J. Sabato, Presidential Nominations: The Front-loaded Frenzy of ‘96, in
TOWARD THE MILLENNIUM: THE ELECTIONS OF 1996 37, 39-40 (Larry J. Sabato ed., 1997)
(explaining that “Dole became the clear party favorite and early front-runner in the 1996 campaign” due to his own shrewdness in seizing “the mantle of the loyal opposition” and due to the
fortuitous non-candidacies of many of his potential rivals).
44. See Scott Keeter, Public Opinion and the Election, in THE ELECTION OF 1996:
REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 107, 123 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1997) (“Dole’s age troubled a minority of voters. Numerous polls asked about the age issue, with an average of 28-35
percent of respondents saying that Dole was too old to be president . . . . When asked by a
CBS News/New York Times poll why Dole’s age was a problem, more respondents (41 percent)
said that it was because he was out of touch with the younger generation . . . .”).
45. See Ronald D. Elving, Dole Turns GOP Majority Status Into Front-Runner Position, 53
CONG. Q. 2011, 2012, 2018 (1995) (“Conservative purists call [Dole] a pragmatist who lacks an
overarching ideology . . . . Dole will never be the champion of those conservatives who have
been described over the years as the New Right . . . . The very qualities professionals appreciate most—such as the ability to reach in all directions crafting a deal—arouse suspicion among
the partisans who decide who gets the party nomination.”).
46. See Benenson, Opponents, supra note 11, at 2049-51; Beneson, Overhaul, supra note
15, at 2159-62; John H. Cushman Jr., Democrats Force the G.O.P. to Pull Anti-Regulation Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at A1, A13 (“Mr. Dole's difficulty in winning his way in the Senate
is the latest illustration of the balance he is trying to strike between his Presidential ambition
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In particular Dole was worried about the rival candidacy of
Philip Gramm, a Republican senator from Texas. Gramm’s conservative credentials were impeccable, and he had begun to criticize Dole
47
for being too moderate. Although Gramm would eventually prove
to be an inept campaigner, he appeared quite formidable at the time
of the risk reform debate. In the words of William Lacy, Dole’s campaign manager at that time: “We felt that Phil Gramm was our principal opponent from day one. . . . And so the campaign was geared
mainly towards dealing with him. As long as we hugged Gramm and
kept him close to us philosophically, we felt we couldn’t lose the nomination.”48
During the congressional risk reform debate, securing the presidential nomination seemed a far more formidable hurdle than win49
ning the general election. The President, having so recently suffered
the humiliation of the 1994 congressional defeats, seemed to have
been weakened beyond repair. Therefore, it made sense for Dole to
err on the side of excessive conservatism in order to secure a nomina50
tion that appeared tantamount to victory. Allying himself with a
key element of the Contract with America, which had recently carried
Republicans into power in 1994, was a reasonable strategy for Dole
51
at the time.
As Majority Leader, Dole had significant discretion concerning
how deeply to involve himself, and how closely to identify himself,
with a particular piece of legislation. His decision to become the principal Senate spokesman on risk reform appears to have stemmed
from his desire to demonstrate to the business community how concerned he was with their regulatory problems and what a staunch deand his role as majority leader, compromising here, shepherding there . . . . Mr. Dole is the
leading candidate for the Republican nomination, but to win it, he must maintain a strongly
conservative posture.”); Walter D. Burnham, Introduction - Bill Clinton: Riding the Tiger, in
THE ELECTION OF 1996: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 44, at 1, 14; William G.
Mayer, The Presidential Nominations, in THE ELECTION OF 1996: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 44, at 21, 52, 62; Sabato, supra note 43, at 38-39.
47. See Benenson, Overhaul, supra note 15, at 2162 (“Phil Gramm, R-Texas, [tried] to portray Dole as more interested in legislative deal-making than in standing for conservative principles.”).
48. Sabato, supra note 43, at 41 (quoting from a personal interview with William Lacy on
August 5, 1996) (emphasis added).
49. See generally DAN BALZ & RONALD BROWNSTEIN, STORMING THE GATES: PROTEST
POLITICS AND THE REPUBLIC REVIVAL 23-28 (1996).
50. See Elving, supra note 45, at 2011 (“[T]he Republican presidential nomination in 1996
. . . may well be the inside track to the White House.”).
51. The public backlash at the GOP and Congressional Republicans over the budget impasse and subsequent government shutdown remained several months in the future.
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52

fender of their interests he was. Passage of Dole’s strong bill, S. 343,
would show business interests how much they had to gain from a
president who was both their strong advocate and a skilled manager
of the legislative process.
Although Dole did agree to tone down the bill in an effort to
53
gain the support of moderate Republicans and Democrats, he refused to yield on the most controversial issue, judicial review, and
this intransigence doomed the bill to defeat. Dole prided himself on
his mastery of the legislative process and on his keen ability to know
when compromise was necessary to save a bill from defeat. Yet,
Dole stood firm during the risk reform battle and allowed the bill to
be defeated. Had he been more willing to yield on the matter of judicial review, he would in all likelihood have garnered the necessary
Democratic votes to gain cloture, the two-thirds majority required to
end debate, and therefore secured passage. Indeed, judicial review
was the most controversial issue within the expert community; thus,
retreating on this point still would have enabled him to remain within
the expert consensus. But judicial review was strongly supported by
the business community and by their conservative congressional allies. Under those circumstances, Dole stifled his love of legislative
craftsmanship in order to protect his right flank in the upcoming
54
presidential primaries.
The failure of risk reform is a powerful reminder of the strong
impact that the specific designs of electoral and legislative systems
have on legislative outcomes. Both the primary system and the Senate’s cloture requirement drove Dole’s decision not to compromise,
because Republicans who favored risk reform controlled the agenda
in both instances. Dole’s unwillingness to compromise on risk reform
helped his primary chances by placating conservative primary voters
55
who viewed him as a moderate compromiser. While in the Senate,
56
the risk reform bill failed due to anti-majoritarian cloture rules.
52. See Bob Benenson, Foes Put Dole on the Alert, 53 CONG. Q. 2050, 2050 (1995)
[hereinafter Benenson, Foes] (The issue of “overhauling the federal regulatory process . . . had
strong backing from both big and small businesses, important components of the GOP’s voting
and fundraising base”).
53. See Benenson, Overhaul, supra note 15, at 2162.
54. See id. (“[A]s Dole gave ground [on the regulatory reform], he heard rumblings from
GOP conservatives who favored a stringent bill. They expressed concern that Dole was giving
away too much to get a bill passed . . . . By drawing the line and forcing a do-or-die cloture
vote, Dole was able to placate anxious conservatives.”).
55. See Richard L. Berke, Poll Finds GOP Primary Voters are Hardly Monolithic, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at A11.
56. Three cloture votes were taken in the Senate. On July 17, cloture failed 48 - 46. On
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Even though Dole consistently obtained the support of a majority of
senators, the cloture rules did not allow Dole to both pass S. 343 and
project a conservative, pro-business image.
C. Bill Clinton and Public Opinion
President Clinton’s stance on risk reform was entirely opportunistic. During the immediate aftermath of the 1994 Republican congressional takeover, he remained silent on the matter. However, he
later opposed risk reform in the wake of events which weakened
57
public support for reducing the size of government.
In these
changed circumstances, Clinton anticipated, better than Dole, the
public’s negative reaction to the 104th Congress’s aggressive attack
on the current regulatory structure.
Many of these events had nothing to do with risk reform in particular or environmental regulation in general. Nonetheless, they
served to put environmental regulation in a better light by diminishing the attractiveness of Congressional Republican attacks on the
government. For example, the Oklahoma City bombing was perpetrated by individuals whose antigovernment rhetoric, while more extreme, resonated with the more radical pronouncements of Congressional Republicans. This identified Republican attacks on the public
weal with extremism and did much to diminish popular enthusiasm
58
for such sentiments. Moreover, the Republican effort to cut Medicare, though quickly abandoned, likewise soured the public on anti59
government crusades. But perhaps the most important development was the inability of House Republicans and the president to
reach a budget compromise that would have averted a federal government shutdown. Ordinary citizens found the shutdown of passport
offices, national parks, and cleanups of hazardous waste dumps to be

July 18, cloture failed 53 - 47. The final cloture vote (58 - 40) occurred on July 20. See Benenson, Overhaul, supra note 15, at 2159.
57. See Kriz, Risky Business, supra note 19, at 419.
58. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Inquiry Urged Into Possible Link Between Anti-Government
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at A22 (reporting that Jeff DeBonis, executive director of an
independent organization of government environmental employees, asked the Justice Department to investigate “possible links between paramilitary organizations and several grass-roots
conservative groups seeking to reduce regulations on private landowners”).
59. See Richard T. Cooper, GOP Changes Held in Check by Earlier Revolutionaries, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at 1; Steve Wilson, Political Pendulum Swinging Back, And GOP is in
the Way, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1995, at A2; William Neikirk, Clock Ticking for Budget
Negotiators; Bargaining Drags On, Testing Voter Patience, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 1995, at 1.
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60

a major inconvenience for which they blamed the Republicans. Additionally, the public perception that the Republican agenda was too
extreme was reinforced by House Republican—attempts to cut the
EPA’s enforcement budget—attempts that were made virtually con61
current with the Senate’s consideration of risk reform legislation.
While fortuitous events began to turn the public mood against
Republican attacks on government, President Clinton recognized and
tried to tap into the public’s longstanding support for environmental
regulation. For decades public opinion polls had consistently de62
picted overwhelming public approval for such regulation. Thus, as
the public mood about government brightened, Clinton seized the
opportunity to remind people how much they cared for the environ63
ment. In addition, he depicted risk reform as a threat to the environmental improvements that government had accomplished. Several
polls recognized that Clinton could increase his popularity by adopt64
ing this more aggressive position on environmental matters.

60. See Marjorie R. Hershey, The Congressional Elections, in THE ELECTION OF 1996:
REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 44, at 205, 212-13.
61. EPA Administrator Carol Browner reinforced such perceptions by stating on July 16,
1995, “It is clear that this is a concerted effort. If they [the Republicans] can’t get it one place,
they try it another place. This is about shutting us down, there can be no mistake.” John H.
Cushman, Jr., G.O.P.’s Plan for Environment Is Facing a Big Test in Congress, N.Y.TIMES, July
17, 1995, at A1.
62. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 5 (2d ed. 1996) (“Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, an annual New York
Times-CBS poll has found sizeable majorities of the public agreeing that 'protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be made too high, and continuing environmental improvement must be made regardless of cost.'”).
63. See Margaret Kriz, The Green Card, NAT’L J., 2262, 2267 (1995) [hereinafter Kriz,
Green Card] (“Democrats are beginning to recognize the potential of playing the environmental card. President Clinton, who’s often been accused of turning his back on the environment is now assuming the role of head environmental gunslinger.”).
64. Dick Morris conducted a poll that was accorded prominent press attention that showed
that Clinton could improve his popularity by adopting a more combative stance on environmental issues. See John H. Cushman Jr., Environment Gets a Push From Clinton, N.Y.TIMES,
July 5, 1995, at A11 [hereinafter Cushman Jr., Environment]. This finding was verified by a
joint NBC-Wall Street Journal poll, a St. Louis Post Dispatch poll, and several polls conducted
by Republican Frank Luntz, all of which showed overwhelming public approval for strict federal environmental controls. See Kriz, Green Card, supra note 63, at 2262. After the Morris
poll, Sally Katzen, the White House administrator of regulatory affairs, led a more aggressive
defense of the regulatory status quo. Katzen maintained, however, that public opinion had no
bearing on the White House’s position on the risk reform bill. Katzen said, “There absolutely is
a more assertive posture [on our part, but] it does not reflect a change of policy as much as the
fact that our policy is now under tremendous assault.” See Cushman Jr., Environment, supra, at
A11.
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Clinton signaled his new aggressive stance on the environment in
65
his Earth Day Speech on April 21, 1995. He claimed that Republican-sponsored risk reform legislation would “throw the gains we have
66
made in health and safety away.” He demanded to know whether
Republicans could “prove that our air will be clean under the laws
that have been proposed . . . [, that] our water will be free of deadly
67
bacteria . . . [, or that] our meat will be untainted?” Neglecting the
exemptions for health emergencies contained in the 1995 legislation,
Clinton claimed that the risk bill would “handcuff” government’s
ability to deal with situations like the distribution of hamburger contaminated with E. coli bacteria that had caused four hundred people
68
to become gravely ill.
Clinton’s committed defense of environmental protection cannot
be overstated here. President Clinton rarely threatened, and never
used, a veto the entire first two years of his term. But by employing
such fevered rhetoric in defense of strict environmental regulation,
Clinton signaled that he would veto any but the mildest type of risk
reform legislation.
Thus, Clinton’s electoral concerns served to erase any middle
69
ground between Dole and himself on this issue. While Dole’s unwillingness to compromise helped him with party conservatives, Clinton’s rigid stance helped him with the broader electorate. Despite efforts by Senators J. Bennett Johnston, John Chafee, John Glenn and
70
others to craft a bi-partisan compromise on regulatory reform, each
party’s presidential hopefuls charted a course away from the political
middle.

65. See Remarks on the 25th Observance of Earth Day in Havre de Grace, Maryland,
1 PUB.PAPERS 562, 564 (1995); see also Al Gore, Earth Days Have Become Earth Years,
N.Y.TIMES, April 23, 1995, at A17 (commenting on the White House’s use of Earth Day).
66. Remarks on the 25th Observance of Earth Day in Havre de Grace, Maryland,
1 PUB.PAPERS 562, 564 (1995).
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Senator J. Bennett Johnston, a Democratic supporter of Dole’s legislation, expressed
his outrage at the White House’s veto threat during congressional negotiations over the legislation. “For the Administration to threaten a veto while we’re in the middle of negotiations is
premature at best and bad faith at worst.” John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Threatens Veto of Bill
Curbing Regulatory Powers, N.Y.TIMES, June 24, 1995, at A28.
70. See Benenson, Overhaul, supra note 15, at 2159.
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D. Conventional Political Science Wisdom Revisited
This story of reasoned political and electoral maneuvering does
not refute the conventional criteria explaining why a bill becomes a
71
law, but it does encourage one to guard against viewing any of those
criteria as dispositive. The political might of business groups regarding environmental legislation is limited, at least when a legislative debate has important electoral implications. The broad popularity of stringent environmental policy has the power to dwarf the
lobbying power of business interests. Likewise, the tactical advantages of posing issues in procedural-technical terms should not be
overstated. The opponents of risk reform countered by sensationalizing what they claimed to be its substantive implications. They
harped on two of the most notorious current public health threats—
bacterial contamination of food and water, and breast cancer—
claiming that risk reform would slow government efforts to deal with
72
them.
Similarly, expert consensus, though important, is not necessarily
decisive in determining the outcome of a legislative struggle. In certain policy areas—taxes or trucking deregulation—experts did win
the day. Their views ultimately came to dominate public opinion.
However, this has never been the case regarding the environment.
Since the 1960s, environmental economists have been preaching the
virtues of cost-benefit analysis. They were later joined by risk scientists, who have tried to make the public understand the concept of
relative risk. Despite their best efforts, though, the role of riskbenefit experts in the environmental policy-making process has been
marginal at best. One sees their impact most vividly in Title V of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which establishes marketable
73
permits for sulfur dioxide. However, that same legislation includes
mandates and timetables that contradict economists’ recommendations and that have far greater economic impact than the acid rain
provisions themselves. Trying to understand why issues involving the

71. See discussion supra Part I.B.
72. One editorial cartoon by Pat Oliphant even portrays Dole as “the leader of a cabal of
witches mixing a cauldron of salmonella, E. Coli bacteria, fecal matter and other poisons into a
‘Dole Stew’.” Benenson, Foes, supra note 52, at 2050.
Regarding the other issue of breast cancer, Senator Barbara Boxer threatened a filibuster
of Dole’s bill. Boxer referred to the 46,000 women that die each year of breast cancer and said,
“I will stand on my feet for 46,000 minutes or 46,000 hours or whatever it takes.” See id.
73. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-661(f) (1994).
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environment have proved so resistant to expert opinion leads directly
to the question of preference formation.
PART III: BEYOND RATIONAL CHOICE: RIGHTS TALK VS.
UTILITARIANISM
Having shown that the defeat of risk reform was driven by electoral politics, it remains to explain why Clinton found it politically
advantageous to oppose a proposal supported by both the business
and expert communities. Clinton is justifiably famous for his finely
honed political sensibilities, and he would not oppose such legislation
unless public opinion was against it. Why then did such popular
opinion form in opposition to risk reform?
If one looks at what was said in opposition to regulatory reform
legislation, it is easier to understand Clinton’s position, as well as the
dominant public view of environmental regulation. The issue does
not boil down to a reasonable versus an unreasonable approach to
environmental issues, but rather to a struggle between two realms of
discourse: one utilitarian, and the other rights-oriented. The former
approach determines the appropriate amount of environmental protection using cost-benefit analysis. The latter posits a right to a
healthy and safe environment, and seeks to secure that right regardless of cost. This latter approach is not obviously “irrational” or even
“religious.” There is no more cause to call this view a “secular religion” than there is to apply that label to utilitarianism. In fact, this
rights-oriented approach has roots in the Declaration of Independence and the whole tradition of Anglo-American Liberalism repre74
sented by Locke, Hobbes and others.
As Sidney Milkis has shown, this rights tradition was significantly transformed as a result of the New Deal which, building upon
what the Progressive Movement had pioneered, expanded the notion
of right to include economic and social aims requiring positive gov75
ernment involvement. He refers to these as “programmatic rights.”
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, these came to encompass rights for consum74. Of particular interest are Locke’s chapters II (“Of the State of Nature”), V (“Of Property”) and IX (“Of the Ends of Political Society and Government”). See JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). For a treatment of the Declaration of
Independence, see, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1958).
75. SIDNEY M. MILKIS & RICHARD A. HARRIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY
CHANGE 341, 374 (1996). A similar theme has also been pursued by Mary Ann Glendon in her
seminal book Rights Talk. See MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
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76

ers, the handicapped, aliens, and the environment. Shep Melnick
claims that this “rights revolution” has led to a significant shift in political discourse.
The “rights revolution” refers to the tendency to define nearly
every public issue in terms of legally protected rights of individuals[,
such as] . . . the handicapped, . . . workers, . . . students, . . . racial, linguistic, and religious minorities, . . . women, . . . [and] consumers, the
right to a hearing, [and] the right to know—these have become the
77
stock and trade of American political discourse.
If politicians’ concern for the 1996 election was the proximate
cause of risk reform's defeat, the public’s preoccupation with rights
78
talk represents the more fundamental cause. This public susceptibility to rights-based arguments in the environmental context framed
Clinton’s understanding of how the risk reform issue would affect his
electoral prospects. Clinton’s embrace of rights talk in his Earth Day
speech resonated powerfully with voters. Thus, playing “the environmental card” led to the public’s rejection of risk reform’s utilitarian characteristics in favor of the moral absolutes implied in rightsbased theories of environmental protection.
Viewing the environment in rights-based terms is widespread
among supporters of both parties. In a review of environmental
polling data, The National Journal found that “polls show Democrats,
Republicans and independents all consider environmental protection
to be an inalienable right that they rank alongside liberty and the
79
pursuit of happiness.” Environmentalists oppose regulatory reform
because they want to maintain the moral high ground which rights
talk provides them. They have triumphed so far because utilitarians
have failed to frame their arguments in an equally compelling way.
Environmentalists also enjoy a comfortable advantage over the busi76. See MILKIS & HARRIS, supra note 75, at 374 (1996).
77. R. Shep Melnick, The Courts, Congress, and Programmatic Rights, in REMAKING
AMERICAN POLITICS 188, 188 (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, eds., 1989).
78. See MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE at x-xi (1991) (Rights talk, or the rhetoric of rights, in the U.S. is "set apart from
rights discourse in other liberal democracies by its starkness and simplicity, its prodigality in
bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities.” This “intemperate rhetoric of personal liberty . . . encourages our all-to-human tendency to place the self at the center of our moral universe.” Furthermore, this American
preoccupation with rights talk leads to “a tendency to frame nearly every social controversy in
terms of a clash of rights” which “impedes compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of common ground.” ).
79. Kriz, Green Card, supra note 63, at 2264.
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ness community and property owners, because the judicial system has
thus far been sensitive to appeals based on the environmental variant
of rights talk. The 1995 regulatory reform legislation would have
granted similarly broad judicial review for some of the staunchest
opponents of the current environmental regulatory community.
When presented with this possibility, environmentalists and opponents of regulatory overhaul used an impassioned, rights talk defense
of environmental regulations to defeat the reform efforts.
In reviewing the defeat of risk reform, it appears environmental
economists and risk scientists have been unable to overcome two
powerful conceptual hurdles. The first involves the human desire for
safety and security. The practical question which people want answered is whether a substance or an activity is safe or not. This leads
to a strong tendency to think in terms of thresholds. If a substance is
found in certain concentrations it is ‘safe’; if it occurs in greater concentrations it is ‘unsafe.’ Risk science, however, denies such comforting certitudes. It emphasizes the relative nature of risk, adopting
80
the motto, “the dose makes the poison.” More is more dangerous;
less is less dangerous. The very nature of environmental problems as
understood by risk science forces one to choose between different
81
levels of insecurity. Safety is a meaningless abstraction. Yet, as
Clinton’s Earth Day speech illustrates, this relativism has not penetrated popular public discourse. If it had, Clinton would have refrained from demanding that any environmental statute guarantee
that meat would be untainted, air would be clean, and water would be
free of bacteria.82
Aversion to risk relativity dovetails with a second profoundly
anti-utilitarian principle—criminality. A utilitarian understanding of
environmental risk is based upon an amoral view of pollution. In this
view, pollution is not a crime, but rather the residual of productive,
beneficial activity. Thus, the appropriate amount of pollution reduction is based on a calculation of the costs of that reduction versus the
benefits the reduction will confer. But the public has been trained to
view polluting as a criminal activity, and therefore not subject to utilitarian calculation. Polluting is akin to murder or rape—acts that are

80. It was Paracelsus who said, “All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a
poison. The right dose differentiates a poison from a remedy.” See Michael A Gallo, History
and Scope of Toxicology, in CASARETT AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF
POISONS 1, 4 (Curtis D. Klaassen, 5th ed. 1996).
81. For a more detailed analysis of this concept, see LANDY ET AL., supra note 27, at 334.
82. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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prima facie wrong and should not be permitted. In principle, the
level of such activity should be reduced to zero. Thus, when environmental economists speak of “acceptable levels” of a particular
pollutant, they are ignoring the public’s moral outrage. While
economists and risk scientists remain free from having to consider
these public attitudes, politicians (especially those running for President) certainly cannot.
This conception of pollution as a criminal activity is not unfounded. Indeed, environmental crimes, such as poaching bald eagles
or midnight dumping of toxic waste, do exist. The public, however,
has received little instruction about how to distinguish between these
relatively rare environmental crimes and the great bulk of polluting
activity that results from reputable productive endeavor.
These conceptual moral hurdles, the human desire for safety and
the conception of pollution as criminal activity, were very much in
place as the 104th Congress began its deliberation on risk reform.
But favorable political circumstances emboldened risk reform supporters to proceed despite persisting evidence of the popularity of the
existing environmental regulatory regime. The Republicans controlled the Congress. The President was politically damaged. The
business community was solidly in support. Therefore, the risks of
arousing public ire by pushing for regulatory reform seemed sufficiently low. However, the positive omens concerning risk reform’s
passage were due not to a shift in public environmental sentiment
toward utilitarianism, but rather to the temporary political submergence of rights-based sentiment. Thus, once events shifted the political tides sufficiently to enable the pre-existing rights-based public
sentiment to resurface, Dole’s risk reform legislation was doomed to
83
fail.
Therefore, an explanation that suggests only that the defeat of
risk reform was driven by electoral politics describes merely one operational phenomenon at work in a more complex scenario. A more
precise picture emerges when our examination of the failure of the
1995 risk reform legislation is broadened to include the fundamental
moral conflict upon which the preferences of the political actors are
based. Absent such a sensitivity to this underlying moral tension, ra-

83. While the 1995 risk reform legislation ultimately failed, efforts to revive regulatory
relief continue. The latest effort is S. 981, sponsored by Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Fred Thompson and Carl Levin. See Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998, S.
981, 105th Cong. § 623-27 (1998). Unfortunately, its broader, bipartisan approach to reform
appears to have attracted support from neither conservatives nor environmental activists.
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tional choice theory remains mired in the rather banal observations
that self-serving politicians operated to satisfy their own electoral
preferences. To pursue an understanding of how such preferences
are formed and informed by competing orders of moral discourse is
to challenge and hopefully improve upon the neo-classical economic
roots of a strictly rational choice study.

